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FLORIDA AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
by JOHN  MEADOR
HE  COMPROMISE OF  1850, which temporarily settled the
sectional dispute over slavery in the territories, had a great
impact upon the political party structure in the United States.
The ultimate result was the destruction of the Whig party, even
though it was that party’s leaders, Clay and Webster, who had
been chiefly responsible for the Compromise. In the North, most
of the party was drawn into the new Republican party, while
its southern members either joined the Democrats or found refuge
in such wobbly makeshifts as the American and Opposition par-
ties. What the Compromise did to southern Whigs appears par-
ticularly ironic when one considers that they were among its
staunchest supporters. Its effects upon them, and on southern
politics in general, may be observed by studying political trends
in Florida during the 1850-1854 period.
The people of Florida had viewed the great sectional con-
troversy of 1846 to 1850 with mixed emotions. All Floridians,
regardless of political affiliations, had good reason to be concerned
with the fate of slavery, for 39,000 of the state’s 87,000 inhabit-
ants were slaves. 1 The Whigs tended to be more conservative
than their rivals because they came from the more affluent ele-
ments of society, and had more to lose by extreme or precipitant
actions. Nevertheless, both parties supported John C. Calhoun’s
contention that slavery should be allowed in all the territories
acquired from Mexico through the Mexican War. 2
Florida’s senior senator, David Levy Yulee, was a faithful
follower of Calhoun. He rejected any sort of popular sovereignty
for the territories, and he did not hesitate to espouse the cause
of the southern social system over the political structure of the
Union. Indeed, Yulee regarded the growing strength of the
North as such a menace that he believed the union of North and
South could not be continued without a constitutional amend-
1 .  T h e  S e v e n t h  C e n s u s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  (Wash ing ton ,  1853) ,
p .  4 0 1 .  
2. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr.,
Florida Monographs”, 
The  Whigs  o f  F lor ida  (“Univers i ty  of
No.  1 ;  Gainesvi l le :  Univers i ty  of  F lor ida
Press, 1959), pp. 35-38.
[ 16 ]
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ment to check northern aggressions. Like Calhoun, Yulee favored
the formation of a states rights party composed of “most of the
Southern Dems. - a large part of the Southern Whigs, and a
considerable strength from the free states.” 3 The other Florida
Senator, Jackson Morton, though a Whig, usually followed in the
wake of his abler colleague, Yulee. Whig opinion was better
represented by Edward C. Cabell, who had been elected to the
House of Representatives in 1846 at the age of thirty. He had
opposed the acquisition of Mexican territory, but once the Treaty
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had gone into effect, he insisted on the
maintenance of southern rights in the new territories. Still,
Cabell was more amenable to making concessions to the North
than was Yulee, as events of 1850 proved. 4
Florida Whiggery reached the pinnacle of its power in the
election of 1848. In that year Zachary Taylor, the Whig presi-
dential candidate, carried the state; Thomas Brown, a conserva-
tive Whig, was elected Governor, while Cabell was triumphantly
re-elected to Congress. The Whigs also gained control of the
General Assembly. That body, meeting early in 1849, passed a
series of resolutions denouncing the sectional controversies and
declaring Florida’s intentions to defend its rights. Of especial
concern was the “right” not to have slavery excluded from the
new territories.
One of legislative resolutions indicated Florida’s willingness
to take part in a southern meeting, if necessary, to protect its
interests. But, when such a convention was actually called to
meet at Nashville in June, 1850, Florida Whigs were not en-
thusiastic over attending the gathering. The pro-Whig Jackson-
ville Republican declared that any action taken by Florida to
affiliate with the convention should emanate from the authorities
of the state. This same newspaper expressed fear that the meet-
ing might become a secession convention. 5 The Marianna Whig
noted the differences among southerners over what would prob-
ably be the most effective steps to take in defending southern




Arthur W. Thompson, “David Yulee: A Study of Nineteenth Cen-
tury Thought and Enterprise,” (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation:
Columbia University, 1954), p. 293.
Dorothy Dodd, “The Secession Movement in Florida,” Florida His-
torical  Quarterly,  XII (July, 1933), 5-6.
Florida (Jacksonville) Republican,  January 10,  24,  1850.
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convention by declaring that the “entire unanimity of the South”
would be wanting at such a gathering. 6 On the other hand, the
St. Augustine Ancient City, which was Democratic in its lean-
ings, urged Florida participation at Nashville so that it could
join the rest of the South in drawing the line up to which the
North could come, but beyond which it could not go. 7
Pressure was put on Governor Brown to endorse the con-
vention and to take appropriate action. The entire Florida con-
gressional delegation, Yulee, Morton, and Cabell, sent the Gov-
ernor a joint letter urging Florida participation. Brown’s reply
was a chilly blast to the convention advocates. What, asked the
blunt Governor, could such a convention do to demonstrate to
the North southern disapprobation of the action of northern
politicians that the legislatures of southern states had not already
done? He cast doubt on the legality of such a convocation, and
expressed doubt that a southern convention would unify the
South-would it not be as likely to stress southern differences as
southern harmony? 8 Response to Brown’s reply was varied.
Senator Morton claimed that the Governor had “expressed the
sentiments of neither of the great parties of Florida.” A “distin-
guished citizen of middle Florida,” writing to a Democratic news-
paper, said that Brown’s letter gave him “melancholy forebodings
of the subjugation of the South.” 9 The Whig press, however,
backed Brown in his stand, for many Whigs feared that the
Nashville convention might end in southern secession - an event
which Florida, in its still undeveloped and unstable condition,
could hardly afford.
Meanwhile, events in Washington were working against any
extremists who might have hoped the convention would result
in secession, for, on January 29, 1850, Henry Clay presented
to the Senate a series of resolutions designed to end the con-
troversy over slavery in the territories. These resolutions became
the Compromise of 1850. Reaction to them was mixed in Flor-
ida, with the Democrats generally unfavorable to them and the
Whigs supporting them. While the Democratic press continued to
6. Quoted by the Florida Republican,  April 11, 1850.
7. St. Augustine Ancient City, April 6, 1850.
8. Ibid. ,  March 7, 1850.
9. Ibid. ,  April  4,  1850; St.  Augustine Ancient City,  March 16, 30,
1850.
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fill its columns with vituperations against northern abolitionists,
Whig editors turned their guns on anti-compromise southern
“fire-eaters.” The Jacksonville Republican assaulted the extrem-
ists, declaring that Calhoun’s speech of March 4 against the
Compromise contained “no word of encouragement-no voice of
promises-no ray of hope-nothing but despair, despair.” 10  
Webster’s speech of March 7 in favor of the Compromise, how-
ever, was hailed as the “harbinger of hope.” 11
Meanwhile, supporters of the Nashville Convention, only
temporarily stalled by Governor Brown’s rebuff, met in various
local gatherings over the state to choose delegates to go to Ten-
nessee. Middle Florida, whose representatives met at Tallahassee,
chose Charles H. DuPont, a Democrat, and A. J. Forman, a
Whig, as delegates. West Floridians convened at Marianna and
chose Congressman Cabell and James F. McClellan, a Democrat.
East Floridians met at Ocala and nominated Colonel B. M. Pear-
son, a Democrat, and General Joseph M. Hernandez, a Whig, to
represent them. Hernandez’s letter of acceptance showed that
Florida Whigs were already perturbed over the failure of their
northern party members to support the Compromise. William
H. Seward’s “higher law” speech, in which the New Yorker an-
swered Webster’s 7th of March address, caused no little con-
sternation among them, and Hernandez hinted darkly in his
letter that the South might have to adopt measures for its own
safety. 12
The success of the efforts of Clay, Webster, and Stephen A.
Douglas in behalf of the Compromise was reflected at Nash-
ville, on June 3, where it was obvious that the force of the
extremist opinion which had impelled the delegates there had
diminished considerably. After passing resolutions condemning
the Compromise, the convention adjourned to await future actions
of Congress. Pearson, one of the Florida delegates, proclaimed
that the meeting had proved that the South could unite; but,
when the convention reconvened in November, Unionist victories
in local elections throughout the South had precluded any likeli-
10. F lor ida  R e p u b l i c a n ,  March  7 ,  14 ,  June  20 ,  1850 ;  S t .  Augus t ine
Ancient  City,  March 23, June 22, November 9, 1850.
11. Florida Republican,  March 21, 1850.
12. Ibid. ,  May 9, 1850; St.  Augustine Ancient  City,  April 13, 1850.
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hood of extreme measures being taken, and the activities of the
body were negligible.
Although the Florida congressional delegation usually voted
together on Clay’s proposals, there was actually a great difference
in their objectives. Yulee and Morton opposed the Compromise
as a whole, arguing that the only concession made by it to the
South was the Fugitive Slave Act and that this was merely a con-
firmation of a constitutional right. Cabell, though he opposed
certain sections of it, upheld the Compromise, overall. 13 Florida’s
Democratic press continued denouncing the settlement, and, when
the Whigs met a series of electoral reverses in other southern
states during the summer, the Ancient City explained them by
saying that the Whig congressmen had refused to stand up for
the rights of the South. 14
The Compromise became the chief issue in the 1850 Florida
elections. The Democrats nominated John Beard, who had once
been registrar of public lands, to oppose Cabell for Congress.
Like Yulee, Beard advocated the extension of the Missouri Com-
promise line to the Pacific, and consequently he opposed the
admission of California as a free state. He professed his faith in
the permanence of the Federal Union, which “is based upon the
truth and force of those principles which the immortal Jefferson
made the ground work of that party, and which were illustrated
by the lamented Calhoun.” 15 Nevertheless, he hinted at the
possibility of secession as a remedy for southern complaints by
proclaiming, “I love the Union with a reasonable affection, and
not with a servile and superstitious reverence as some great in-
visible deity.” 16 Cabell and the Whigs seized the opportunity to
attack Beard as a disunionist. Cabell declared the issues to be
between union or disunion and between war or peace, and said
he was for union and peace. 17 Beard daringly accepted the Whig
challenge and proclaimed his opposition to the Compromise even
to the extent of secession. 18 He had swallowed the bait and the
Whigs based their campaign against him largely on the charge of
disunionism. They also chided him for his previous rather
13. Dodd, “The Secession Movement in Florida,” pp. 9-10.
14. St. Augustine Ancient City, August 31, 1850.
15. Ibid. ,  June 29, 1850.
16. Florida Republican, August
17. Ibid. ,  September 26, 1850.
29, 1850.
18. Ibid. ,  September 26, 1850.
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enigmatic political affiliations. He had been Marshall of East
Florida under the Tyler administration, and it was rumored
that, in 1840, he had been a Whig. 19
The Democrats endeavored to counteract this criticism of
their candidate by attacking Cabell for his refusal to stand four-
square behind the rights of the South, and for his alleged failure
to carry out his promise to have the Indians removed by force
from lands desired by white Floridians. 20 They also scored Cabell
for affiliating with a party dominated by abolitionists such as Se-
ward and Joshua Giddings. The congressman was urged to appeal
to his fellow southern Whigs to withdraw from their alliance with
the “abolitionists” of the North, and, instead to unite with the
Democrats, “the only party in the North which has stood up, or
will stand up, for the rights of the South, as secured and guar-
anteed by the Constitution.” 21 Cabell was also charged with
hypocrisy for supporting the Nashville Convention and later de-
claring that “Never, either as Representative or candidate, will I
assume the awful responsibility of recommending to you a dis-
solution of the Union.” 22
The election, which was held in October, was a victory for
Cabell, though his margin of 1848 was somewhat reduced. He
polled 4,531 votes to 4,050 for Beard. Cabell carried those
areas of the state which had the most to lose by a continued
agitation of the slavery issue, that is, the wealthy and populous
cotton and tobacco counties. Beards support came from the more
sparsely settled, frontier-like areas of southern and eastern Flor-
ida. The election results did not prove that Floridians approved
the Compromise of 1850. Beard, running on an extremist, anti-
compromise stand, polled approximately 47 per cent of the vote,
and Cabell had voted against particular parts of the Compromise,
himself. Moreover, the Democrats won control of the state legis-
lature which they had lost two years before. This fact certainly
suggests dissatisfaction in Florida with Whig policies, although
many of the legislative races were doubtlessly determined by
local issues.
One of the first duties that faced the new General Assembly
19. Ibid. ,  July 25, 1850.
20. St. Augustine Ancient City, Oct. 5, 1850.
21. Ibid. ,  March 23, 1850.
22. Ibid. ,  September 21, 1850; Florida Republican, Oct. 3, 1850.
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when it met in 1851 was that of electing a Senator to succeed
Yulee the next year. There were elements, both within and out-
side the Democratic Party, who were opposed to a second term
for Yulee, and they managed to replace him with Stephen Russell
Mallory, a Key West Democrat. It has been said that the reason
a few Moderate Democrats in the legislature combined with the
Whigs to elect Mallory over Yulee was because of the latter’s
extreme stand against the Compromise. But there was at least
one other important factor in the defeat of Yulee - railroads.
Yulee was opposed by certain “interests” because of his advocacy
of a Fernandina to Cedar Keys Railroad. Persons representing a
company that favored a Jacksonville to Pensacola route were
known to be in Tallahassee trying to influence legislators against
Yulee. Also, Key West commercial interests feared that any
trans-state railroad would siphon off some of their business, and
there was general disgruntlement against Yulee in south Florida
because it was felt that he had neglected that area. The result
was that Mallory forces of Key West and those of the southeast
coast combined with the Whigs to elect Mallory on the fourth
ballot. 23
The interpretation off Mallory’s election as a slap in the face
of the extreme states righters loses credibility when it is realized
that Mallory was a states-rightist himself, and that he had former-
ly supported Yulee. In fact, he had favored the Nashville Con-
vention and had even been elected an alternate to it. 24  The
Ancient City interpreted his election to the Senate as having put
the Whig seal of approval on a strong pro-southern rights stand
because they had supported a known states rightist. 25 Even the
pro-Whig Tallahassee Sentinel admitted that Mallory might be
another Yulee, though it expressed hope that he would follow
a more enlightened course than his predecessor. 26 Actually, it
is not accurate to picture Mallory as an extreme southern rights
man, for in a letter to B. M. Pearson, written at the time of the
Nashville Convention, though he declared his approval of the
Convention, he emphasized that “In Union is our safety.” 27
23. Thompson, “David Yulee: A Study of Nineteenth Century Thought
and Enterprise,” pp. 62-63.
24. Dodd. “The Secession Movement in Florida,” pp. 15-16.
25. St.  Augustine Ancient  City,  January 25, 1951.
26 .  F lo r ida  (Ta l l ahassee )  S e n t i n e l ,  Februa ry  4 ,  1851 .
27. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal ,  February 8, 1851.
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Thus he had tried to act as a brake on the disunionists. Never-
theless, Mallory’s election to the Senate was not a manifestation
of Florida’s approval of the Compromise.
Throughout most of 1851, Florida Democrats continued to
be opposed to the Compromise. Early in that year their chief
organ, the Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, could still be found
denouncing Clay and his measures. 28 As late as September 6,
the Jacksonville News, also Democratic, expressed its disgust with
northern Democrats for having supported the Compromise, and
declared its desire to “obliterate old party animosities” within the
South. 29 This wish to substitute a sectional party for one involv-
ing cooperation with Compromisers was to some extent coming
true, as states-rights associations were being organized in Gadsden,
Leon, Jefferson, Madison, and perhaps other Florida counties. 30
The constitution adopted by the Gadsden association promised to
maintain the doctrine of states rights as set forth by the Kentucky
and Virginia resolutions and “to insist upon the constitutional
rights of the Confederacy and to sustain the honor and integrity
of the same.” 31 The states-rightists pledged themselves to sup-
port staunch southern rights men and to boycott northern manu-
facturers with abolitionist leanings. Perhaps 10 per cent of Leon
County’s electorate belonged to one of these groups, while the fig-
ure ran as high as 33 per cent in Madison County. 32
Florida Whigs showed greater interest, however, in the idea
of a Constitutional Union Party, which, according to the News
was to be “composed of all the Whigs, and as many Democrats
as will be necessary to carry the Presidential election.” 33 This
party, claimed its supporters, would exclude the two extremes,
the abolitionists in the North and the “resistance” men of the
South. A group of citizens meeting at Palatka, in April, endorsed
the idea and adopted resolutions rejecting the old party lines and
affirming their support of the Union. 34 Prominent Whig leaders,
such as Governor Brown, former Governor Richard K. Call, and
28. Ibid. ,  January 4,  11,  1851.
29. Jacksonville News, Sept. 6, 1851.
30. Dodd, “The Secession Movement in Florida,” p. 12.
31. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, June 7,  185 1. T h e “Confeder-
acy,” in this instance, meant the United States.
32. Dodd, “The Secession Movement in Florida,” p. 12.
33. Jacksonville News, December 20, 1851.
34. Florida Sentinel, February 18, April 29, 1851.
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Congressman Cabell commented favorably on the idea of a party
to preserve southern rights within the Union. 35
Actually, the Constitutional Union Party was merely the
Whig Party with a new name and exploiting a single issue. That
issue was the imminent peril of the Union. Since the Whigs had
used this same battle cry in 1850, it had lost much of its effec-
tiveness. “If the Union requires to be saved every six months,”
wryly commented the News, “. . . it won’t pay to attend to the
business.” 36 The Democrats pooh-poohed the Constitutional
Union movement as an attempt to bolster the sagging Fillmore
administration, and its leaders were pictured as a set of demago-
gues who would sacrifice the interest of the South to party expedi-
ency. 37 This was in part true, for the Whigs were desperately
trying to capitalize on their support of the Compromise by organ-
izing a party whose primary tenet was the maintenance of the
Union.
The turning point in the attitudes of the two parties towards
the Compromise came late in 1851 when the success of Unionist
candidates in Georgia and Mississippi became known in Florida.
The defeat of states-rightists in these states caused Florida Demo-
crats to drop their states-rights organizations and to deny that
they had ever been for disunion. 38 Florida Democrats now ac-
cepted the Compromise, if a bit reluctantly, and they began to
compare the great fidelity of northern Democrats to the principles
of 1850 with the coolness of northern Whigs. 39 They seem to
have anticipated accurately the troubles southern Whigs were go-
ing to have with the northern wing of their party, and they adopt-
ed a policy designed to profit from Whig dissensions. They also
proclaimed their acceptance of the settlement of 1850. This
shrewd move paid off handsomely when many Whigs discovered,
later on, that they could no longer remain in the same party with
their northern allies.
The fact is that the Florida Whigs desperately needed a new
political party, for the one with which they were affiliated was
3 5 .  Ib id . ,  November  11 ,  December  2 ,  1851 ;  Doher ty ,  The  Whigs  o f
Florida, p. 50.
36. Jacksonville News, December 20, 1851.
37.  Ibid. ,  May 17, May 24, 1851; Tallahassee Floridian and Journal,
February 15, 22, March 8, April 26, May 3, May 24, 1851.
38. Jacksonville News, November 22, December 6, 1851; Florida Senti-
nel ,  November 25, 1851.
39. Jacksonville News, November 22, 1851.
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crumbling beneath them. Northern Whigs were coming to be
increasingly under the influence of their anti-slavery wing. Al-
though Florida Whig leaders tried to divert attention from this
fact by playing down the northern threat to slavery and by point-
ing to the free-soil elements in the Democratic Party, they were
whistling in the dark. 40 An examination of the vote on two
important measures in the House of Representatives shows how
badly split their party was. The first is the Fugitive Slave Law,
which was supported by every southern member of the House,
regardless of party affiliation. The Democrats managed to get a
majority of their northern members to vote for this pro-southern
bill, but the northern Whigs cast 57 votes against it and only 3
for it. Similarly, on a resolution presented early in 1852, declar-
ing the Compromise of 1850 to be a finality, southern Whigs cast
the largest percentage vote of any group for the resolution, while
northern Whigs cast the largest percentage vote against it. 41
Whig disunity was furthered by a congressional caucus that
met in the spring of 1852. Here, southern Whigs tried to intro-
duce resolutions declaring the Compromise to be final, but they
were ruled out of order. The southerners, including Cabell and
Morton, walked out of the caucus and adopted an address to
explain their action. They warned their fellow Whigs not to fail
to endorse the Compromise at the National Convention that was
to meet at Baltimore on June 16. 42 Meanwhile, rumors to the
effect that the free-soil Whigs were going to dump President Fill-
more, who had manifested a friendly attitude toward the South,
for General Winfield Scott, caused some consternation in Florida
Whig ranks. Cabell wrote to the Albany, New York, Register that
if the sectional animosities of your people to the South are
such that an able, patriotic, northern man is to be put down
by northern men merely because he has discharged plain
Constitutional Whig duties, there can no longer be any
sympathy of feeling or cooperation between the parties North
and South. . . . 43
Florida Whigs received much well-calculated sympathy from
4 0 . Florida Sentinel ,  July 15, December 16, 1851; Pensacola Gazette,
February 7, 1852.
4 1 . Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, April 10, 17, 1852.
4 2 . Pensacola Gazette,  May 8, 1852.
4 3 . Quoted by Ibid. ,  April 17, 1852.
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the Democrats for the browbeating they were taking at the hands
of northern Whigs. The Floridian and Journal declared that
southern Whigs were becoming nothing but “hewers of wood and
drawers of water” for the free-soil majority of their party. There
was only one alternative, said this newspaper, and that was union
with the Democrats, for very little now separated the two parties.
Whereas once Florida Democrats had been ashamed of the sup-
port given by northern Democrats to the Compromise, they now
boasted that the Democracy had been “firm as the rock of the
Ocean in their support of it, and in every instance repudiated all
further agitation for repeal or modification.” 44  The southern
leaning of their party was extolled by the Democrats, and they
declared that the free-soilers were being driven out of the party. 45
In the spring of 1852 the Democrats determined to wage the
election of that year on a platform endorsing the Compromise.
On the local level, they chose James E. Broome, a Leon County
planter for Governor, and Augustus E. Maxwell, a pro-Com-
promise Democrat, for Congress. Broome had fought the Com-
promise vigorously, but, like the rest of his party, he supported
it during this political campaign. 46  The National Democrats,
meanwhile, met at Baltimore and chose Franklin Pierce, a little-
known New Hampshire politician, for the presidency. Their
platform declared the Democrats’ adherence to the Compromise.
The Whig Pensacola Gazette termed this statement of principle
“eminently creditable;” and added “if the Whig Convention be
less honest and true, it must, and deservedly will, plunge into the
abyss of political self annihilation.” 47
While all was going so well for the Democrats, there was
some debate among Florida Whigs over whether or not they
should send delegates to their National Convention. Many south-
ern members of the party had been alienated by the cavalier treat-
ment they had received at the hands of the northerners. The
Gazette, however, urged Florida to send delegates in support of
Fillmore who, it said, of every hundred Whigs in Florida “is the
choice of at least ninety-nine.” 48  Florida did send delegates,
44. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal ,  January 10, 2 0 ,  1 8 5 2 .
45. Ib id . ,  M a r c h  2 7 ,  1 8 5 2 .
46. Pensacola Gazette, May 8, 1852.
47. Ibid. ,  June 12, 1852.
48. Ibid. ,  May 1, 1852; Tallahassee Floridian and Journal  March 13,
1852.
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and they voted for Fillmore on all fifty-three ballots. This availed
them naught, however, for Winfield Scott, the candidate of the
free-soil wing of the party, received the nomination. As a sop to
southerners the convention half-heartedly “acquiesced in” the
Compromise, but this hardly assuaged their disappointment over
the nomination of Scott. Cabell angrily attacked the old general
for his silence on the Compromise. “His best friend cannot say
that he is not now controlled by Seward and his followers . . .
Far better will it be for the national men of our party that a con-
servative Democrat be elected.” 49
The Whig state convention, which met in July to nominate
candidates for Governor and Congressman, almost ended in an
open rupture. The gubernatorial nominee, George T. Ward, a
wealthy conservative, Union Whig, refused to run on the same
ticket with Cabell because of the latter’s denunciations of Scott.
There were even suggestions that Cabell be dropped from the
Whig slate. Governor Brown tried to restore some semblance of
harmony by moving for the ratification of the Whig presidential
nominee, and this motion was carried 34 to 5, with only Gadsden
County opposing it. A unit system, however, whereby a majority
of each county cast the entire vote of that county, masked much
of the opposition to Scott. Then the quarrel between Ward and
Cabell was patched up by the latter’s agreeing to “acquiesce” in
Scott’s nomination. 50 Both men were nominated all over again.
The incongruity of running a pro-Scott man and an anti-Scott
man on the same ticket did not escape the attention of the Demo-
cratic press: “Surely such a farce was never before played off on
an enlightened community!” exclaimed the Floridian. 51
Throughout the campaign, Florida Whigs were confused,
divided, and on the defensive. The Gazette, laboring under the
strain of having to support both Cabell and Scott, deplored the
Congressman’s hostility to the Whig presidential candidate, al-
though it could hardly afford to censure him. 52  Other Whigs
besides Cabell made known their opposition to Scott. For exam-
ple, Colonel Thomas Waddell, of Fayettesville, a “firm Whig,”
49. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, July 10, 1852; Dodd, “The Seces-
sion Movement in Florida,” pp. 16-17.
50. Pensacola Gazette, July 31, 1852; Tallahassee Floridian and Journ-
al,  July 17, 1852.
51. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal ,  July 17, 1852.
52. Pensacola Gazette,  July 31, 1852.
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announced in a card to the newspapers that he could not vote for
Scott because if the latter were elected in 1852 Seward would
be the Whig nominee in 1856. 53  The Whigs tried to combat
the drift away from them by vicious assaults on Pierce. He was
pictured as a coward, an abolitionist, an anti-foreigner, and an
anti-Roman Catholic. He was also depicted as being the candi-
date of the British, on the grounds that England hated Scott be-
cause of his part in the War of 1812, and that Pierce, being for
a low tariff, would be more amenable to the British policy of free
trade. 54
The Whig charges against Broome were much more just.
They accused him of having been a disunionist in 1850 and
1851, and quoted him as having said of the admission of Cali-
fornia that “they tore the Constitution in rags and tatters, leav-
ing the miserable remnants not worth preserving.” 55  Broome
was now saying that he had always favored the Union “on the
principle of the Constitution,” 56 but the Sentinel pointed out that
even the most extreme southern rights men of 1850 had said this
much. 57 The Whigs, who were the traditional advocates of in-
ternal improvements at government expense, also emphasized the
necessity for such improvements in Florida. Railroads, harbors,
and other things needed by a young, primitive state would hardly
be provided by “Locofoco Democrats,” they insisted. 58
The Democrats returned the Whig fire by assailing Scott for
his famous (or infamous) order No. 48, issued when he was
commanding an expedition against the Indians in Florida during
the thirties. The order was made in reply to complaints by Flor-
idians about the Indians, and it implied that the former were
overly nervous, if not downright cowardly. Floridians who re-
called this incident were not well disposed toward Scott. 59 The
Democrats received further ammunition to use against the gen-
eral when it became known that Thaddeus Stevens, the Pennsyl-
vania anti-slavery leader, had endorsed his candidacy. 60
53. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal ,  August 7, 1852.
54 .  Pensaco la  Gaze t t e ,  Ju ly  17 ,  Augus t  7 ,  14 ,  28 ,  Sep tember  4 ,  25 ;
Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, August 14, 1852.
55. Pensacola Gazette, October 2, 1852.
56.  Ibid. ,  September 25, 1852.
57. Quoted by Ibid. ,  September 25, 1852.
58.  Ibid. ,  September 11, 1852.
59. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, August 7, 1852.
60.  Ibid. ,  September 4, 1852.
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Broome castigated the Whigs for their failure to support
resolutions endorsing Scott and the Compromise. 61  This was
strange talk coming from one who had originally opposed Clay’s
measures of 1850, but Broome made it clear he was not letting
go of all of his states rights principles. He praised the Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 as “the platform upon which
the party was organized, the foundation upon which it has rested,
and the great political textbook to which it declared its allegiance
in June last.” 62
In a speech delivered at Tallahassee he avowed his support
of the Compromise but said that he would not be bound by it if
California were suddenly to decide it wanted slavery. 63  The
Democratic press pictured him and Pierce and Maxwell as stand-
ing stoutly behind the Compromise, and explained away Broome’s
changed attitude towards it by saying that he had at first opposed
the Compromise on principle, but had accepted when it became
obvious that the people of the South had done so. 64 Thus the
Florida Democrats accomplished a clever about face towards the
Compromise. In 1850 and 1851 they had been opposed to it.
Now, to gain Union sympathizers, they expressed approval of the
Compromise, though they managed to hold on to their states
rights elements by also voicing pro-southern sentiments.
The election for state-wide offices took place in October, and
the Democrats, Broome and Maxwell, won narrow victories over
the Whigs, Ward and Cabell. The race for Congressman was
particularly close, with Maxwell polling 4,590 votes to 4,568 for
Cabell. 65 Just how much their bickering and dissensions cost the
Whigs is hard to tell. They lost strength in the rich “black belt”
area of the state, where Cabell dropped Gadsden and Leon Coun-
ties to Maxwell. Perhaps a partial explanation for this loss is
simply the fact that the Democrats were much more conservative,
economically speaking, than they had been in the days of Jack-
son, and thus their policies were more palatable to the planter
class. 66 Also, recent migrations into Florida from Georgia and
South Carolina had added greatly to the strength of the Demo-
Ibid. ,  September 11, 1852.
Ibid. ,  September 11, 1852.
Ibid. ,  April  14, May 22, June 19, 1852.
Ibid. ,  May 29, 1852.
Florida Republican,  October 26, 1854.
Doherty, The Whigs of  Florida,  p. 46.
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crats. 67 Still, the Whigs’ losses of Florida offices were probably
caused at least partly by the Florida slaveholder’s reluctance to
give his support to a party that had such strong abolitionist lean-
ings in the North. This distrust in Florida of the National Whig
Party was vividly demonstrated in the November presidential
election, when Pierce overwhelmed Scott in Florida by receiving
4,318 votes, while 2,875 proved to be all his Whig opponent
could muster. 
This election was a most significant turning point in the
decline of the Whigs in Florida. In October the party had still
been strong enough to make a close contest of the gubernatorial
and congressional races. If they had not been divided, and if
they had not been burdened by Scott, Seward, and the northern
Whigs, they probably would have emerged victorious from the
October elections. They did not lose the election of 1852 in
Florida. They lost it in the North, where the free-soil wing of
their party rejected the Compromise of 1850 and, in so doing,
destroyed the party. 
Although they had been handed a near death blow in 1852,
the Florida Whigs were still alive enough in 1854 to emit one
last dying gasp. In that year the Compromise, which had held
the center of the political stage since 1850, was shoved out of
the limelight by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. As one of its clauses
repealed the Missouri Compromise, this new law opened to
slaveholders lands which, since 1820, had been forbidden to
them. Whig newspapers in Florida deplored the measure as a
needless reopening of the slavery issue, although they approved
the principle of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The
Republican feared that the North would become enraged by this
southern victory, and would take reprisals by violations of the
Fugitive Slave Law even more flagrant than those which had
recently been occurring. 6 8 The Floridian, however, praised the
bill, claiming that the Whigs had been destroyed by it, while the
Democrats were left stronger by being purged of their free-soil
elements. 69
The Democrats met at Madison in July to select a candidate
for congressman. Maxwell was renominated and the Kansas-
 67. Ibid. ,  pp. 56-57.
68. Florida Republican, June 29, 1854.   
69. Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, July 8, 1854.
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Nebraska Act was heartily endorsed. This action led the Repub-
lican to remind the Democrats of their 1852 pledge to “resist
all attempts to renew . . . the agitation of the slavery question,
under whatever shape or color the attempt be made.’’ 70  The
Floridian, though, ignored such criticisms and pointed proudly
to the fact that about half the northern Democrats in the House
of Representatives had supported the act, while every northern
Whig Representative had opposed it. 71
Florida Whigs, themselves, had by this time gotten fairly
well disgusted with their northern colleagues’ failure to cooperate
with them. The Sentinel declared that “. . . one sentiment per-
vades the Whig Party in Florida, and that sentiment is a waiver
of our obligations to Northern Whiggery and c.’’ 72 The Floridian
applauded the Sentinel’s break with northern Whigs and urged
that paper to come over to the Democratic fold. 73 The Republi-
can, however, rebuffed Democratic entreaties for a Whig- Demo-
cratic alliance, and denied that the issues concerning slavery had
disrupted the Whig Party. At a time when Whigs throughout the
North were being absorbed into the new anti-slavery Republician
Party, this newspaper was denying that the northern Whig Party
was being dissolved or abolitionized! 74 The Democrats continued
their arguments, however, declaring that unless the Whigs united
with them “they can do the South no good.’’ 75
The Whigs rejected the idea of a state-wide convention, and
nominated former Governor Thomas Brown for Congress by local
meetings in various counties. Brown, like the Republican, refused
to disaffiliate himself from the northern Whigs. He had to strug-
gle, though, to maintain the separate identity of his party, and
thus he overstressed the differences, both in history and the pres-
ent, between the Whigs and Democrats. 76 He criticized the
Democrats particularly for their opposition to the “peace meas-
ures” of Clay and Webster, and for reopening the slavery con-
troversy with the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 77 Although the Demo-
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of 1850, the Whig press ridiculed their efforts and cited the
extreme statements against it in 1850 by Yulee, Beard and
Broome. 78 Maxwell based part of his campaign on a bill which
he had introduced in Congress to grant alternate sections of the
public lands to aid in railroad construction. The Democratic
candidate also took full credit to his party for the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, and he praised the Pierce administration’s
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. 79
The result of the election was a Democratic landslide, with
Maxwell getting 5,633 votes to 4,564 for Brown. Brown re-
gained Gadsden County, in middle Florida, which Cabell had lost
two years before, while losing Escambia and Walker Counties
in western Florida. In the east, Brown carried only three of the
six counties won by Cabell in 1852, while winning over only
Hamilton County from the Democrats. 80  The Democrats’ vic-
tory is explainable by the continued decline of their opponents and
by their great propaganda victory contained in the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise. The election was the last one in which
the Whigs functioned on a state-wide basis in Florida. They
were succeeded in 1855 by the American Party, which, in turn,
gave way to the Constitutional Union Party. But neither of
these successors to the Whigs was able to break the Democratic
hold on Florida politics.
The long range effect, then, of the Compromise of 1850 on
the party structure in Florida was the severance of the ties of
Florida Whigs with their northern allies and the ultimate extinc-
tion of the party throughout the state. The re-election of the
Whig, Cabell, in 1850 had indicated the unwillingness of Flor-
idians to sanction precipitous measures at that time, although
it can hardly be regarded as a great victory for the Compromise.
In 1851, with the rise of Unionist activity throughout the South,
the anti-Compromisers, mostly Democrats, began to review
their stand on the great issue of the day, and by 1852 the Demo-
crats had emerged as qualified exponents of the Compromise. In
their campaign to woo dissident Whigs over from the camp of the
enemy, Florida Democrats received inestimable aid from northern
78. Ibid., September 28, 1854.
79. Ibid., August 17, 1854.
80. Ibid., October 26, 1854; Doherty, The Whigs of Florida, pp. 59-60.
17
Meador: Florida and the Compromise of 1850
Published by STARS, 1960
FLORIDA AND THE  COMPROMISE OF  1850 33
Whigs, who almost seem to have embarked on a campaign to
alienate as many southerners from their party as possible. The
Whig debacle of 1852 permanently sealed the fate of the party,
for the election of 1854 was a mere confirmation of Whig im-
potence. All but the most partisan Whigs recognized that the
party had been dissolved into factions, many of which were al-
ready being reassembled into the Republican and American Par-
ties in the North. Florida Whigs saw little to be gained from
supporting a purely sectional or local party; therefore many of
them crossed partisan lines to join the one national party that
seemed to be interested in preserving to the South its rights-the
Democrats. 
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